Deskewing the Searlean Picture: A New Speech Act Ontology for Linguistics by Zaefferer, Dietmar
Deskewing the Searlean Picture: 
A New Speech Act Ontology for Linguistics 
DIETMAR ZAEFFERER 
Ludwig-Maximilians-University, Munich 
0. Introduction
The overall aim of this paper is to present a speech act ontology that is motivated 
by general assumptions about the nature of human language and implicational 
universals about the grammatical coding of illocutionary force (sentence mood 
markers). In particular, I want to show five things: first, that the Searlean picture 
is skewed in that it misrepresents universally attested distinctions, overemphasizes 
non-universal aspects of human language, and misses important generalizations; 
second, that a linguistically more fruitful picture can be developed on the basis of 
implicational universals that constrain the range of possible codings of sentence 
mood and other modalities; third, that this linguistic picture can be grounded on 
very few elementary and universally valid assumptions about the nature of human 
language and its functions; fourth, that this grammatically motivated reconstruc-
tion helps in analyzing intricate syntactic patterns that interrelate German clause 
types; and finally, that the Searlean picture can be embedded in the linguistic 
picture in such a way that nothing gets lost in the deskewing process that merits 
preservation. 
1. A Classification of Illocutions:
John Searle’s Proposal of a Philosophical Picture
More than 30 years ago, Searle (1975) proposed a classification (initially called a 
taxonomy) of basic illocutions with five major categories and two subcategories 
which, slightly rearranged and represented in tree format, looks as follows: 
(Other
Directive)
Question
Directive Commissive Representative
Representative
Declaration
Declaration Expressive
Illocution(1) 
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The aim was to come up with a systematic picture of the most basic categories of 
illocutionary acts, i.e. of those types all other types would be subtypes of.1 
 
1.1. How Systematic is the Searlean Picture? 
At its time Searle’s proposal constituted a tremendous step forward towards a 
principled terminology in speech act theory. It replaced the rather poorly defined 
classification outlined in the last lecture of Austin’s How to Do Things with 
Words (Austin 1955) with a much more systematic account based on a decompo-
sition of the notion of illocutionary force into its main factors. Searle found out 
that “there are (at least) twelve dimensions of variation in which illocutionary acts 
differ from one another” (1975:345): 1) point or purpose, 2) direction of fit, 3) 
expressed psychological state, 4) strength of the point, 5) status of participants, 6) 
relations to interests of participants, 7) relations to rest of discourse, 8) proposi-
tional content, 9) non-linguistic performability, 10) dependence on extra-linguistic 
institution, 11) possibility of performative use of describing verb, and 12) style. 
Although the resulting classification2 pictured above and based mainly on the first 
three of these factors certainly represents a major improvement over its predeces-
sor, upon closer scrutiny this account turns out to be less systematic than it looks. 
 
1.2. Main Shortcomings of the Searlean Picture 
There are at least nine respects in which Searle’s proposal seems to be 
unsatisfactory. First, the top criterion point or purpose is ill-defined: there are 
always many purposes associated with an action, and even after narrowing down 
primary purposes the question remains open how these are to be identified. 
Second, the definitional value of both point and expressed psychological state is 
virtually eliminated at least with Representatives, whose point is to commit the 
speaker to the truth of the expressed proposition and whose expressed state is 
belief, by the claim that both are dimensions and that the “degree of belief and 
commitment may approach or even reach zero...” (Searle 1975:355). How can a 
belief or commitment with degree zero be identified? This leaves the words-to-
world direction of fit as the only reliable definitional criterion. Similar problems 
arise with Directives and Commissives. Third, direction of fit is problematic 
itself, at least in its usual characterization (cf. Sobel and Copp 2001). Fourth, the 
classification is not a partition: its categories are neither pair-wise disjoint nor 
jointly exhaustive. Fifth, it disregards implicational universals of sentence mood, 
which is by definition that part of clause typing that indicates illocutionary force. 
Sixth, it destroys the integrity of the questions by subsuming them under the 
Directives: although canonical questions may be special cases of Directives, not 
all questions are. Seventh, it attributes a role and weight to Commissives, Declara-
                                                 
1 The dotted line between Representative and Representative Declaration indicates that the latter is 
a subcategory not only of Declaration, but in a way, also of Representative. 
2 There have been two changes from the first publication to the second (and later ones): in the title, 
Taxonomy was replaced by Classification, and in the text Representatives was substituted by 
Assertives. 
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tions, and Expressives that is poorly motivated. Eighth, it is incomplete in that it 
leaves no room for exclamations. Finally, quinary branching in a classification is 
always a good reason for double-checking if there are no possible higher distinc-
tions that have been overlooked. 
 
2.  A Taxonomy of Illocutions: 
The Grammar-Based Approach to a Linguistic Picture 
Figures (2) and (3) show the new picture to be discussed below (the sub-tree 
dominated by the Structured Epistemic Telic node has been exported for display 
reasons). Those nodes in the figures that correspond to nodes in figure (1) are 
labeled in italics.  
 
Holistic
Atelic
Holistic
Telic
Holistic
Directive Promissive
Exhortation
Structured
Direct
Telic
Structured
Epistemic
Telic (3)
Structured
Telic
Structured
Pure Atelic
Expressive Exclamation
Representative-
Atelic-Hybrid
Structured
Atelic
Structured
Oral
Illocution
 
Commissive Representative
Exophoric
TET
Representative-
Extralinguistic-I-
Hybrid
Pure
Extralinguistic
Institutive
Extralinguistic
Institutive
Individual
Intralinguistic
Institutive
Social
Intralinguistic
Institutive
Intralinguistic
Institutive
Holophoric
TET
Transparent
Epistemic
Telic
Opaque
Epistemic
Telic
Structured
Epistemic
Telic
 
 
(2) 
(3) 
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One motivation for the new taxonomy, which is an enriched and considerably 
improved successor to the one proposed in Zaefferer (2001), comes from hypo-
theses about implicational universals of sentence mood marking (cf. Hengeveld et 
al. 2007, König and Siemund 2007, Pak et al. 2005). Each branching of this tree 
corresponds to both a classification criterion and an assumed universal. Starting 
from the root, the most relevant criteria and universals (U) are: 
 
(A)  Structure: presence of an overt distinction between sentence mood mean-
ing and propositional content. An oral illocution is structured if its form 
reflects the force-content distinction, and holistic otherwise. U: if a lan-
guage has structured illocutions, then it has holistic illocutions as well. 
 
(B)  Telicity: presence of a volitional attitude aiming at a specific stage transi-
tion. An oral illocution is telic if its sentence mood meaning expresses 
such an attitude, and atelic otherwise. U: if a language has telic illocutions, 
then it has atelic illocutions as well. (Atelic holistics are interjections like 
Wow!, telic holistics interjections like Hist!) 
 
(C)  Epistemicity: presence of an epistemic attitude layer between the volition 
and the propositional content. A telic illocution is epistemic if its ex-
pressed volition aims at such an attitude towards the content, and direct if 
it aims at the content itself. U: if a language has epistemic illocutions, then 
it has direct illocutions as well. 
 
(D)  Promissivity: presence of a direct volitional attitude towards propositional 
content that exclusively characterizes a course of action of the agent. A di-
rect telic illocution is promissive if its expressed volition aims at such con-
tent, it is directive if its expressed volition aims at content that exclusively 
characterizes a course of action of the addressee, and it is exhortative if its 
expressed volition aims at content that characterizes a joint course of ac-
tion of the agent and the addressee. U: if a language has promissive illocu-
tions, then it has exhortative illocutions, and if it has exhortative illocu-
tions, then it has directive illocutions as well. 
 
(E)  Opacity: property of a characterization of an epistemic attitude that speci-
fies only the dimension of variation of its content. An epistemic telic illo-
cution is opaque if its expressed volition aims at such partially specified 
propositional content; it is transparent if its expressed volition aims at fully 
specified content. U: if a language has opaque epistemic telic illocutions, 
then it has transparent epistemic telic illocutions as well. 
 
(F)  Holophoricity: property of the propositional content of a given illocution 
that is present exactly if this content refers to the whole illocution it is part 
of. An epistemic telic illocution is holophoric if its expressed volition aims 
at an epistemic attitude towards propositional content that refers to the 
whole embedding illocution, else it is exophoric. U: if a language has 
holophoric epistemic telic illocutions, then it has exophoric epistemic telic 
illocutions as well.  
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Note that telic and epistemic illocutions involve the presence of modal opera-
tors, which by definition come in pairs of dual counterparts. The strong telic 
modal is volition, and its weak counterpart is toleration (absence of preventing 
volition); the strong epistemic modal is knowledge, and its weak counterpart is 
non-exclusion (absence of excluding knowledge). Interestingly, only the strong 
epistemic attitude can be characterized both transparently and opaquely; the weak 
epistemic attitude allows only for transparent characterization. 
 
3. An Ontology of Illocutions: Grounding the Linguistic Picture 
3.1. Basic Hypotheses about Human Language and Its Core Functions 
To turn a hierarchy of categories or taxonomy into an ontology, it is necessary to 
embed its definitions in a coherent account of the whole domain. Here is a rough 
outline of such a conceptualization. To begin with, it seems safe to assume that 
there are three elementary kinds of language use that can be characterized roughly 
as follows (l-association means here some language-specific association relation 
that is based both on convention and intention): 
 
(A)  covert active language use, which consists in unperceivable pre-motor 
activity that triggers l-associated mental events;  
(B)  overt active language use, which consists in perceivable motor activity that 
makes l-associated mental events inferable; and 
(C)  receptive language use, which consists in perception of motor activity and 
inference of l-associated mental events. 
 
This derives the following two core functions of language use: 
 
(i)  mind activating and structuring with (A) and (B) above; and 
(ii)  mind sharing, i.e. co-activating and co-structuring, with (B) and (C).  
 
Assuming that there are four major kinds of mind sharing (cf. Zaefferer 2007), 
namely (a) attention sharing, (b) emotion sharing, (c) goal sharing, and  
(d) knowledge sharing, we get some support for the linguistic picture of section 2: 
whereas type (a) is relevant for all illocutions in that it introduces shared topics, 
type (b) is relevant mainly for atelic illocutions, type (c) is relevant for telic 
illocutions, and type (d) is relevant for epistemic illocutions. 
 
3.2. A Cognitively Viable Concept of Propositional Contents 
3.2.1. Cognitivized Austinian Propositional Contents 
A considerable part of the inspiration for the new picture came from the observa-
tion that there is much more interaction between kinds of propositional content 
and illocutionary forces than is generally assumed. To cash in on that insight it 
proved helpful to replace the usual possible-world modeling of propositions by 
something capable of doing a better job in guiding analytic intuition. Based on 
ideas from Austin (1950) and Barwise and Etchemendy (1987), I have developed 
the notion of cognitivized Austinian propositional content, or CAP for short (cf. 
Zaefferer 2006). 
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Formally, a CAP is an ordered pair <s, T>, where s is a mentally represented 
situation token and T is a mentally represented situation type. An applied CAP, or 
ACAP for short, is an ordered pair <t, p>, where t is a situation token and p is a 
CAP. If P with P:=<t, <s, T>> is an ACAP, we call t the topic of P, s the token of 
P, and T the type of P. 
 
3.2.2. Reconciling Categoriality and Gradience of Truth via Decomposition 
The structure of ACAPs permits a decomposition of the venerable notion of truth 
into an internal and an interface component. Internally, we call an ACAP congru-
ent if its token is of its type, and incongruent otherwise. Congruence is categorical 
and models the intuition that in a congruent ACAP, the type is true of the corre-
sponding token. Concerning the interior-exterior interface, we call an ACAP 
‘matching’ to the degree its token corresponds to its topic and ‘mismatching’ in 
the absence of such a correspondence. Thus, match is gradient and models the 
intuition that in a matching ACAP the token is more or less true to the corre-
sponding topic (for the true to-true of distinction, cf. Austin 1950). 
 
3.2.3. A Little Typology of Propositional Contents 
Now we are in a position to distinguish between different kinds of propositional 
contents. We stipulate that a blueprint proposition is congruent by definition (it is 
a definition of a goal). It can be felicitiously used in a direct telic if its 
applications are mismatching in all alternative continuations, i.e. without the telic 
being performed. It has been successfully used in a direct telic to the degree its 
token matches the topic of its application in the real world. This is why direct 
telics are not said to be true, but rather more or less well realized. 
In contrast, a picture proposition can be congruent or incongruent. It can be 
used only in a transparent epistemic and can be evaluated in two ways: either it is 
assumed to be congruent and then the degree of match of the corresponding 
application can be stated, or its application is assumed to match to a given degree 
and then congruence can be checked.  
Finally, a near-proposition is defined as having an empty token; therefore, the 
question of congruence does not arise. It can be felicitously used as top proposi-
tions only in an opaque epistemic. Note that once a near-proposition is applied by 
building a token that more or less matches the topic, it becomes a congruent or 
incongruent picture proposition, if possibly open parameters in its type are fixed. 
 
3.3. A Fresh Look at Directions of Fit  
For the new picture, the following four kinds of direction of fit have proved more 
helpful than Searle’s two (or four, including the double and the empty case): MR-
match (mind-to-reality) occurs in perception and the formation of sufficiently 
matching applied picture propositions; RM-match (reality-to-mind) in intentional 
action, including the more or less true realization of blueprint propositions; MM-
match (mind-to-mind) in all kinds of mind sharing, including the trustful interpre-
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tation of picture propositions; and RR-match (reality-to-reality) in replication, 
including the imitation of perceivable activities. 
 
3.4. Outline of a Sentence Mood-Based Ontology of Illocutionary Acts 
Using the tools developed so far, the following definitions of sentence mood 
meanings or basic illocutionary forces can be devised: 
 
(Dec) The meaning of the declarative sentence mood is the transparent epistemic 
telic structured illocution type. In uttering a declarative sentence with 
propositional content p (a picture proposition), the agent entitles the ob-
server to infer that in doing so he aims at activated knowledge of p. In 
ideal communication this has the effect that the involved agents add p to 
the shared knowledge. 
 
(Int) The meaning of the interrogative sentence mood is the opaque epistemic 
telic structured illocution type. In uttering an interrogative sentence with 
propositional content p (a near-proposition), the agent entitles the observer 
to infer that in doing so he aims at activated knowledge of p. In ideal 
communication this has the effect that the addressee turns p into a suffi-
ciently matching congruent applied proposition and contributes the result 
to the shared knowledge. 
 
(Imp) The meaning of the imperative sentence mood is the direct telic structured 
illocution type. In uttering an imperative sentence with propositional con-
tent p (a blueprint proposition), the agent entitles the observer to infer that 
in doing so he aims at a realization of p by the addressee. In ideal commu-
nication this has the effect that the addressee adds p to the shared goals. 
 
(Exc) The meaning of the exclamative sentence mood is a hybrid that consists in 
part of the transparent epistemic telic structured illocution type and in part 
of the atelic structured illocution type. In uttering an exclamative sentence 
with propositional content p (a picture proposition), the respective agent 
makes it inferable that her aim is (a) activated knowledge of p, and (b) 
emotional expression of the unusually high degree to which p holds. In 
ideal communication this has the effect that the agents add p to the shared 
knowledge and the corresponding emotion to the shared emotions. 
 
4.  Testing the New Picture with Some Quirky German Clause Types 
4.1.  Canonical and Less Canonical German Clause Types 
4.1.1.  Canonical Clauses 
German root clauses, which by definition possess illocutionary force potential, are 
canonically verb-initial (verb-first (4) or verb-second (5)), whereas embedded 
clauses, which lack force, are canonically verb-final (6)-(7).  
 
(4) Fliegt Peter nach Rom?   ‘Flies Peter to Rome?’ 
(5) Peter fliegt nach Rom.   ‘Peter flies to Rome.’ 
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(6) [Maria weiß,] ob Peter nach Rom fliegt.   ‘[Maria knows] if Peter to Rome flies.’ 
(7) [Maria weiß,] dass Peter nach Rom fliegt.   ‘[Maria knows] that Peter to Rome flies.’ 
 
4.1.2. Non-Canonical Clauses  
But there are also, more peripherally, verb-final root (8)-(10) and verb-initial 
embedded clauses (11) (PART glosses an emphatic particle):  
 
(8) Ob Peter nach Rom fliegt? ‘If Peter to Rome flies?’ 
(9) Dass Peter nach Rom fliegt! ‘That Peter to Rome flies!’ 
(10) Dass du ja nach Rom fliegst! ‘That you PART to Rome fly!’ 
(11) [Ich hoffe,] Peter fliegt nach Rom. ‘[I hope] Peter flies to Rome.’ 
 
4.2.  Explaining the Properties of Non-Canonical Clause Types 
4.2.1.  Gain of Force through Insubordination: Verb-Final Root Clauses 
Truckenbrodt (2006) aims at a uniform explanation based on the absence of finite 
morphology in C, but he admits that exclamative uses are outside the scope of his 
approach. Given the functional heterogeneity – (8) raises the question without 
expecting an answer, (9) expresses amazement, (10) insists on the compliance 
with an order, and there are some more – an alternative seems preferable: 
 
(O) Orphan theory of verb-final root clauses 
  
(O) claims that verb-final root clauses still show the effect of different matrix 
clauses with speaker subjects which are gone forever – not hidden by ellipsis, but 
roughly recoverable as expressing wondering, amazement, and insistence, respec-
tively (other attitudes are possible) – and which determine, together with the type 
of the content (near-proposition (8), picture propositions (9), blueprint proposition 
(10)), the different non-canonical forces of these clauses. Thus, (O) is able to 
account for the functional heterogeneity of verb-final root clauses. 
 
4.2.2. Loss of Force through Subordination: Verb-Initial Dependent Clauses 
Whereas all V2-clause embedding matrices also embed VL-clauses (cf. (11) and 
(12)), the inverse does not hold (cf. (13) and (14)), and worse, modified V2-
embedders may lose this ability (cf. (15)): 
 
(12) Ich hoffe, dass Peter nach Rom fliegt. ‘I hope that Peter to Rome flies.’ 
(13) Ich bezweifle, dass Peter nach Rom fliegt. ‘I doubt that Peter to Rome flies.’  
(14) *Ich bezweifle, Peter fliegt nach Rom.    ‘I doubt Peter flies to Rome.’ 
(15) *Ich hoffe nicht, Peter fliegt nach Rom. ‘I do not hope Peter flies to Rome.’ 
 
I think that Truckenbrodt (2006) is on the right track in trying to explain the 
embeddability restrictions on V2-clauses by force effects: whereas canonical 
subordinates suffer complete loss of force, non-canonical subordinates keep at 
least some of their force and this imposes constraints on the embedders. Gärtner’s 
proto-force absorption hypothesis says that V2-clauses come with an assertive 
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proto-force, which in the absence of an embedder turns into a full force, whereas 
in the presence of an embedder it has to be absorbed (entailed) by it. The problem 
with the approach is that it is unclear what an assertive proto-force is and how, for 
instance, an epistemic attitude can be entailed, e.g. by hope. 
The picture outlined above suggests a more satsifying account: 
 
(W) Weak epistemic layer theory of embedded V2-clauses 
 
(W) says that in embedded V2-clauses, (a) only the epistemic layer of the 
transparent epistemic telic force remains, and (b) the epistemic attitude is only a 
weak one (lack of excluding knowledge, or ‘nexclusion’ for short). Hoping p 
entails nexcluding p; therefore, (11) is ok. Not hoping or doubting p does not 
entail nexcluding p (although it may implicate it); therefore, (14) and (15) are out. 
Note that neither (O) nor (W) would be derivable from the old picture. 
 
5. Relating the New Picture to the Old One  
Looking back, we are now in a position to determine the reason for the skew in 
the old picture that has been removed in the new one. The undeniable merits of 
Searle’s picture come from the fact that it is a fairly adequate picture of the major 
illocutionary acts, at least for a prototypical Western culture where commitments 
and obligations play a central role. But major illocutionary acts and basic illocu-
tionary acts are not the same, and if we compare the two pictures it seems reason-
able to assume that the major skewing factor is what Barwise and Perry (1983:38) 
have called the fallacy of misplaced information. This will become clear in the 
following section where the definitions of the nodes in (1) will be compared with 
those of their (italicized) counterparts in (2) and (3). 
First, let us have a look at Directives. According to Searle, an illocution with 
propositional content p is a Directive if it is an attempt with the degree of strength 
x by the agent to get the addressee to realize p. According to the new picture, a 
Directive is a structured direct telic with propositional content that characterizes 
exclusively an action of the addressee. This is in line with data like those from 
Korean that show that in this language, promissive, exhortative, and directive 
speech acts can be coded by sentences that differ minimally in the choice of the 
sentence-final particle (-ma, -ca, or -la, respectively) and the person features of 
their subjects, and which apart from that constitute a single clause type (Pak et al. 
2005). If we take this formal commonality seriously, then we should see it as an 
indicator for a functional common denominator. This is obvious in the new 
picture (a volitional attitude with goals that differ only in who controls their 
attainability), but it is hard to see how it could be developed from the old one.3  
                                                 
3 The obvious inadequacy of analyzing promises as requests to oneself, i.e. attempts to get oneself 
to do something, caused Searle to reject this idea (1975:356). 
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The terms in which Searle couches his criticism of the new definition show 
that he does not sufficiently appreciate the significant distinction between volition 
and desire:  
 
The utterance “Come” does more than just express a desire that the hearer come, as is 
shown by the fact that she [the speaker] might consistently say “Of course, Max, I want 
you to come, but I am not actually asking or requesting you to come”. If his account were 
right it would be impossible to express such a desire without thereby issuing a directive, 
but there are lots of examples to show that this is wrong. (Searle 2001:289) 
 
I think his argument goes through, but it relies crucially on the fact that wanting is 
underspecified with respect to the abovementioned distinction and therefore can 
be used to express also mere desire. So his example cuts just the other way 
around: it assumes that the speaker could not consistently say Of course, Max, I 
said to you ‘Come’ and I meant it, but I was not actually asking or requesting you 
to come. The new definition explains this inconsistency by saying that an 
unmarked utterance of an imperative expresses a volitional attitude towards the 
content. Given that volition, in contrast to desire, entails reachability of its target 
with the available means, it will be hard for Max to argue OK, she has expressed 
that she aims at my coming and assumes that to be within her reach, but that does 
not mean she is trying to get me to come. 
Next, let us compare the definitions of the Representatives. According to 
Searle’s definition, the point of a Representative is to commit its speaker with the 
degree of strength x to the truth of the propositional content, whereas the new 
picture entails that whoever performs a Representative licenses the inference that 
he aims at activated knowledge of the propositional content. Since the intended 
possessor of this knowledge is not specified, this entails a nice account of an 
example that Searle rightly produced as an argument against an earlier version of 
the new picture: it is consistent to say I don’t care whether you assume that it is 
raining, all the same it’s raining (Searle 2001:288). This is at odds with the 
earlier version (Zaefferer 2001) which analyzed Representatives as aiming at the 
assumption of the content by the addressee, but not with the current version, 
which entails that, given that the intended possessor of the knowledge cannot be 
the addressee, it must rather be the speaker himself, and which secondarily invites 
the inference that the addressee is intended to infer this (Whether or not you 
accept it, I know it). 
Searle’s analysis of Representatives as commitments to the truth of their con-
tent provides an especially clear illustration of the fallacy of misplaced informa-
tion: commitments result from the agent’s responsibility for the possible conse-
quences of an action, be it linguistic or something else. When the air traffic 
controller utters The runway is clear, he is strongly committed to the truth of what 
he says because he could cause the death of hundreds of people, and when the 
shop customer replies I am fine to the cashier’s routine question, she is not com-
mitted at all to the truth of this Representative, although she licenses the inference 
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that she aims at activated knowledge that she is doing fine, but in view of the 
pertinent social conventions this knowledge is easily devaluated. 
The label Declaration from the old picture has been replaced by holophoric 
transparent epistemic telic (holophoric TET for short) in the new one, and again 
this indicates a reconceptualization. Although Searle’s defining characteristic of 
this class, “that the successful performance of one of its members brings about the 
correspondence between the propositional content and reality” (1975:358), has 
been adopted, both his assumption of a double direction of fit and his claim that a 
successful performance results in “some alternation in the status or condition of 
the referred to object or objects” (1975:358) are rejected. The propositional 
content of a holophoric TET is congruent by definition, and in case of a successful 
performance, it is matching as well. In that case, there is also a mind-to-mind fit, 
which explains why the relevant reality can only be social or individual 
institutional reality. Cases like This is a reminder that the use of cell phones is not 
permitted on our flights are problematic for Searle’s claim because it is not clear 
what the change of state of the referent could be, but they are not so for the new 
picture. 
Another shortcoming of the old picture is the non-disjointness of its 
categories. An especially clear case is what Searle calls Expressives, speech acts 
characterizable in English by verbs like thank, congratulate, apologize, condole, 
deplore, and welcome. The purpose of Expressives is “to express the 
psychological state specified in the sincerity condition about a state of affairs 
specified in the propositional content” (Searle 1975:356). The examples show that 
this is quite misleading: although the propositional content of I apologize for 
stepping on your toe includes a specification of the state of affairs the relevant 
attitude is about (that I stepped on your toe), the complete content rather 
characterizes what the agent is doing in making his utterance. Since the 
propositional content refers to the whole act it is a proper part of, this is a clear 
case of a holophoric transparent epistemic telic, i.e. an illocution that aims at 
activated knowledge of the proposition that the agent apologizes for stepping on 
the addressee’s toe, which is congruent by definition, and which is matching 
exactly if the apology is performed. Given that apologies are an intralinguistic 
social institution, they illustrate the reallocation of Searle’s Expressives to the 
rightmost node at the bottom of (3). This concludes the comparison of selected 
nodes of the two pictures. 
I hope to have shown that the skew of the Searlean picture results from his 
failure to distinguish between basic illocutionary force as expressed by sentence 
mood and canonical illocutionary force as expressed by the given mood in default 
situations. Consequently, a deskewed picture can be obtained by assuming rather 
lean sentence mood meanings that can easily be strengthened in default situations 
to yield canonical forces, but which also serve to account for other forces in virtue 
of their compatibility with different, non-default situations.  
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